Abstract-In the article m dimensional lexicographic noncooperative games
X imputation and its set ) (v E is defined in v game. It is proved that ) (v E is nonempty and its full characterisation is given. Domination over ) (v E set is defined. Thus, the main foundations are given, according to this, it is possible to explore the main principles of optimality. In  game players simultaneously and independently choose their strategies so that they don't inform each other about it. Therefore  game is called a noncooperative or noncoalition. Players strategic behaviours are studied in such games, with the help of such strategies they get this or that kind of guaranteed payoffs (utilities). Hence, the task is to find 
IndexTerms
P. Fishburn [1] defined a lexicographic matrix game and its equilibrium situation in the mixed strategies. He gave an example of such kind of game and showed that an equilibrium situation does not exist in mixed strategies. It is shown by him, that there exists a game where the first player has not got a maximin strategy, and the second -a minimax strategy; there exists a game, where the first player has a maximin strategy, the second has a minimax strategy, but they are different. V. Podinovski [2] defined a lexicographic finite antagonistic game and explored the problems about the existence of an equilibrium situation in a lexicographic matrix game.Lexicographic noncooperative games with the existence of conditions of an equilibrium situation is studied by G. Beltadze [3, 4, 5, 6, 7] .
In the process of studying lexicographic cooperative games there exists some problems connected to the existence of a characteristic function and imputation. The existence of C-core in lexicographic cooperative games are studied by G. Beltadze [8] . In the given article we discuss the foundations of lexicographic cooperative games, that is necessary for studying the principles of optimality. We show some differences and similarities in the process of studying them to classical cooperative games. The main part of the paper is studied in the II-V sections. 
be a lexicographic noncooperative game, for n player's and 
Some main properties of scalar noncooperative games' characteristic functions are maintained in a lexicographic case. Particularly, such kind of property is superadditivity.
Proof. Analogically to the famous result that exists in a classical cooperative game theory we can write the following relations: 
The theorem is proved. 
For a scalar zero-sum noncooperative game's characteristic function a property of complementary always takes place. But for a lexicographic zero-sum noncooperative game a property of complementary maybe won't fulfill.
Theorem 2.2. If a lexicographic
zero-sum noncooperative game's characteristic function fulfills the property of complementary, then every lexicographic matrix game .
Condition (1) means that
In fact here the exact equality takes plase. ) (
Let divide 1) case into two subgroups: 
Let choose other elements in * X matrix from the conditions:
Let us show that the given 
This is equal to the condition
After taking this and (2) into the consideration we have an exact equality 
Proof. It is obvious that
Therefore, on the basis of the theorem 3.2 it is sufficient to show that for any ) (
As it fulfills an equality ) ( 
. The theorem is proved.
IV. DOMINATION OF AN IMPUTATION
For the purpose of studying the principles of optimality in lexicogrsphic cooperative games, as well as in the theory of classical cooperative games, it is necessary to define the apparatus of domination on the set of imputation.
Definition 4.1. We say that from
We write (6) condition in the following way 
This theorem shows that in the process of studying every points connected to the lexicographic domination of the imputation is sufficient to be limited by a completely L -essential cooperative game.
V. COOPERATIVE GAME'S NORMALIZATION
Sometimes it is necessary to compare each other different cooperative game's meanings in one and the same coalition. For this we introduce a concept of a lexicographic cooperative game's normalization. Let define a lexicographic cooperative game's strategic equivalence in advance. 
